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Secret parameters in quantum bit commitment
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The no-go theorem of unconditionally secure quantum bit commitment depends crucially on the
assumption that Alice knows in detail all the probability distributions generated by Bob. We show
that if a protocol is concealing, then the cheating unitary transformation is independent of any
parameters (including probability distributions) secretly chosen by Bob, so that Alice can calculate
it without knowing Bob’s secret choices. Otherwise the protocol cannot be concealing. Our result
shows that the original impossibility proof was based on an incorrect assumption, despite the fact
that its conclusion remains valid within the adopted framework. Furthermore, our result eliminates
a potential loophole in the no-go theorem.
PACS numbers: 03.67.Dd, 03.67.Hk, 03.67.Mn
Keywords: quantum bit commitment, quantum cryptography
The security of quantum bit commitment (QBC)
is an important issue in quantum cryptography be-
cause QBC is a primitive which can be used as the
building block of other important two-party crypto-
graphic protocols [1].
A QBC protocol involves two parties customarily
named Alice and Bob. Alice secretly commits to a
bit b (0 or 1) which is to be revealed to Bob at a
later time. In order to bind Alice to her commit-
ment, the two parties execute a series of quantum
and/or classical procedures, so that at the end of
the commitment phase, Bob is in possession of a
quantum mechanical state |ψ(b)B 〉. The idea is that,
with additional classical information from Alice in
the unveiling phase (when she unveils the value of
b), Bob can use |ψ(b)B 〉 to check whether Alice is hon-
est. A QBC protocol is said to be binding if Alice
cannot change her commitment or Bob will find out.
Furthermore it is concealing if Bob can obtain no in-
formation about the value of b before it is unveiled,
which implies that the encoding density matrix ρ
(b)
B
of the state |ψ(b)B 〉 is independent of the value of b,
i.e.,
ρ
(0)
B = ρ
(1)
B . (1)
A QBC protocol is secure if and only if it is both
binding and concealing. Moreover, if a protocol is
secure even if Alice and Bob had unlimited compu-
tational power, then it is said to be unconditionally
secure.
In 1997, Lo and Chau [2, 3] and Mayers [4, 5]
proved that unconditionally secure QBC is impossi-
∗Electronic address: cheung@phys.sinica.edu.tw
ble. In a nutshell, the proof goes as follows. It is ob-
served that the commitment process, which may in-
volves any number of rounds of quantum and classi-
cal exchange of information between Alice and Bob,
can always be represented by an unitary transforma-
tion U (b) on some initial state |φAB〉 in the combined
Hilbert space HA ⊗HB of Alice and Bob:
|Ψ(b)AB〉 = U (b)|φ(b)AB〉, (2)
Without loss of generality, we can take |φ(b)AB〉 and
|Ψ(b)AB〉 to be pure states. In this approach, Alice and
Bob do not fix their undisclosed classical parameters
in the commitment phase, but leave them undeter-
mined at the quantum level instead. This is called
quantum purification. In general it requires that Al-
ice and Bob have access to quantum computers with
unrestricted capacities, which is consistent with the
assumption that they have unlimited computational
power.
Therefore instead of honestly following the origi-
nal protocol, Alice can always follow a modified pro-
tocol as described above, so that at the end of the
commitment phase, there exists a pure state |Ψ(b)AB〉
in HA ⊗HB. As long as the reduced density matrix
on Bob’s side is unchanged, i.e.,
TrA |Ψ(b)AB〉〈Ψ(b)AB| = ρ(b)B , (3)
Bob has no way of knowing what Alice has actually
done. Then it follows from Schmidt decomposition
theorem [6, 7] that,
|Ψ(0)AB〉 =
∑
i
√
λi |eiA〉 ⊗ |ψiB〉, (4)
and
|Ψ(1)AB〉 =
∑
i
√
λi |e′iA〉 ⊗ |ψiB〉, (5)
2where {|eiA〉}, {|e′iA〉}, and {|ψiB〉} are orthonormal
bases in the respective Hilbert spaces as indicated,
and λi’s are real coefficients.
Notice that apart from the sets of bases {|eiA〉} and
{|e′iA〉}, |Ψ(0)AB〉 and |Ψ(1)AB〉 are identical. Since {|eiA〉}
and {|e′iA〉} are related by an unitary transformation
UA acting on Alice’s Hilbert space HA only, we also
have
|Ψ(1)AB〉 = UA|Ψ(0)AB〉. (6)
The existence of UA implies that Alice has a sure-win
cheating strategy (called EPR attack): Alice always
commits to b = 0 in the beginning. Later on, if she
wants to keep her initial commitment, she unveils as
prescribed. However if she wants to switch to b = 1
instead, she just needs to apply the unitary transfor-
mation UA to the particles in her control, and then
proceeds as if she had committed to b = 1 in the first
place. The crucial point is that, because of Eq. (1),
it is impossible for Bob to find out what Alice actu-
ally did, and he would conclude that she is honest in
either case. Hence if a QBC protocol is concealing,
it cannot be binding at the same time. This is the
conclusion of the “no-go theorem” of uncondition-
ally secure QBC.
Note that the no-go theorem only proves the exis-
tence of the cheating unitary transformation UA in
a QBC protocol which is concealing, but there is no
proof that UA is always known to Alice. The point
is, at the end of the commitment phase, the overall
state |Ψ(b)AB(ω)〉 may depend on some unknown pa-
rameter ω secretly chosen by Bob. If the reduced
density matrix
ρ
(b)
B (ω) = TrA|Ψ(b)AB(ω)〉〈Ψ(b)AB(ω)| (7)
is independent of b, then in principle a cheating
transformation UA(ω) exists, so that
|Ψ(1)AB(ω)〉 = UA(ω)|Ψ(0)AB(ω)〉. (8)
However without the knowledge of ω, Alice cannot
calculate UA(ω) by herself. As a result uncondition-
ally secure QBC may be possible. This is a potential
loophole of the no-go theorem.
The no-go theorem emphasizes that one should
purify all undisclosed classical variables in analyz-
ing the security issues. Even so, the question re-
mains: What if Bob is allowed to choose probability
distributions secretly? To this question, the authors
of the no-go theorem state that “In order that Al-
ice and Bob can follow the procedures, they must
know the exact forms of all unitary transformations
involved” [2, 3], and “It is a principle that we must
assume that every participant knows every detail of
the protocol, including the distribution of probabil-
ity of a random variable generated by another partic-
ipant” [5]. In other words the no-go theorem asserts
without proof that in any QBC protocol the overall
state |Ψ(b)AB〉 cannot contain any unknown parame-
ters. This assertion is in fact not correct, and it
has caused confusion among researchers. Without
clarifying this issue, the impossibility proof is not
complete and the no-go theorem will continue being
challenged [8]. In any case, as long as it does not
jeopardize the security of a protocol, there is no rea-
son why a party has to disclose the values of any
secret parameters he/she might have chosen in the
commitment phase.
To settle this issue, we prove the following theo-
rem. The secret parameter ω will be taken to be a
probability distribution, because in a fully quantum
description, probability distributions are the only
unknowns left. Except for the issue of secret pa-
rameters, we shall stay within the QBC framework
adopted by the no-go theorem.
Theorem 1 If a QBC protocol is concealing, then
the cheating unitary transformation is independent
of any probability distributions (ω’s) secretly chosen
by Bob.
Proof If Bob is allowed to choose ω in secret, he
can always postpone his choice with the help of a
quantum computer. That means, instead of picking
a particular ω = ωi and keeping it secret, he can
purify his choices with a probability distribution pi =
{pi}. The resulting overall state is given by
|Ψ′(b)AB(pi)〉 =
∑
i
√
pi |Ψ(b)AB(ωi)〉 |χi〉, (9)
where {|χi〉} is a set of orthonormal ancilla states in
Bob’s Hilbert space HB. The new density matrix is
given by
ρ
′(b)
B (pi) = TrA|Ψ′(b)AB(pi)〉〈Ψ′(b)AB(pi)|. (10)
Since the protocol is concealing, we have
ρ
′(0)
B (pi) = ρ
′(1)
B (pi) (11)
for all possible pi. Consider the case where pi 6= 0,
for all i. According to the no-go theorem there exists
a cheating unitary transformation U ′A, such that
|Ψ′(1)AB(pi)〉 = U ′A |Ψ′(0)AB(pi)〉. (12)
It is easy to see that this same U ′A also transforms
|Ψ(0)AB(ωi)〉 to |Ψ(1)AB(ωi)〉 for all possible ωi, i.e.,
|Ψ(1)AB(ωi)〉 = U ′A |Ψ(0)AB(ωi)〉, ∀ωi. (13)
3The reason is that Bob can obtain |Ψ(b)AB(ωi)〉 from
|Ψ′(b)AB(pi)〉 by collapsing the ancilla states {|χi〉} on
the right hand side of Eq. (9). Since U ′A acts on
Alice’s Hilbert space HA only, it commutes with
any operations executed on Bob’s Hilbert space
HB. Consequently Eq. (12) holds independent of
whether the ancilla has been measured or not, and
Eq. (13) follows. Hence U ′A is independent of ω.
To avoid a circular argument, we need to show
that U ′A is also independent of the probability dis-
tribution pi = {pi}. As shown in the Appendix,
any superposition of probability distributions can be
rewritten as a single effective distribution. That is,
by a redefinition of the ancilla states on Bob’s side,
we can rewrite |Ψ′(b)AB(pi)〉 of Eq. (9) as
|Ψ′(b)AB(pi)〉 = |Ψ(b)AB(ωj(pi))〉. (14)
Substituting Eq. (14) into Eq. (12), we see that
U ′A might depend on pi through ωj(pi). But that is
not possible since we have already proved that U ′A
is independent of ωi for all i [see Eq. (13)]. Hence
the EPR cheating transformation U ′A does not de-
pendent on pi. QED.
Therefore in a concealing QBC protocol, the
cheating unitary transformation UA is independent
of any secret probability distributions chosen by
Bob, and Alice can calculate UA without knowing
Bob’s particular choices. In fact, according to the
corollary proven in the Appendix, UA cannot depend
on any probability distribution (specified or secret)
generated by Bob. This contradicts the claim that,
to be able to cheat, Alice must know every detail of
the protocol, including all the probability distribu-
tions generated by Bob, so that no unknown param-
eter is allowed in |Ψ(b)AB〉 [2, 3, 4, 5].
Conversely, if in any protocol the cheating unitary
transformation is claimed to depend on a secret pa-
rameter ω chosen by Bob, then the protocol must
be non-concealing under closer scrutiny. Thus our
result eliminates a potential loophole in the no-go
theorem.
In summary, we find that there is nothing wrong
with secret parameters in QBC. We prove that in
a concealing protocol, the cheating unitary trans-
formation is independent of any parameters secretly
chosen by Bob. Our result shows that the original
proof of the no-go theorem [2, 3, 4, 5] was based on
an incorrect assumption. Nevertheless, even with se-
cret parameters, unconditional security remains im-
possible within the framework adopted by the no-go
theorem.
Appendix
Suppose Bob chooses an unitary operator in {Vk}
with a probability distribution ωi = {qik} and ap-
plies it to a state |φAB〉, such that
|ψAB〉 = Vk|φAB〉. (15)
As is well known, if Vk is not disclosed, Bob can
postpone (or purify) his decision by entangling with
a set of orthonormal ancilla states {|ξk〉}, so that
instead of |ψAB〉, he generates
|ΨAB(ωi)〉 =
∑
k
√
qik |ξk〉Vk|φAB〉. (16)
Likewise, if ωi is not disclosed, Bob can also purify
his choices with another probability distribution pi =
{pi}, such that
|Ψ′AB(pi)〉 =
∑
i
√
pi |χi〉|ΨAB(ωi)〉, (17)
=
∑
i,k
√
pi
√
qik |χi〉|ξk〉Vk|φAB〉,(18)
where {|χi〉} is another set of orthonormal ancilla
states.
Theorem 2 Purifying a probability distribution
[in Eq. (17)] is equivalent to picking a new effective
one [in Eq. (16)].
Proof Define
q′k ≡
∑
i
piqik, (19)
so that
∑
k
q′k = 1. (20)
On the right hand side of Eq. (18), we write
∑
i
√
piqik |χi〉 =
√
q′k
∑
i
√
piqik/q′k |χi〉
=
√
q′k |χ′k〉, (21)
where
|χ′k〉 ≡
∑
i
√
piqik/q′k |χi〉. (22)
Note that the |χ′k〉’s are normalized but not neces-
sarily orthogonal.
Substituting Eq. (21) into Eq. (18), we get
|Ψ′AB(pi)〉 =
∑
k
√
q′k |χ′k〉|ξk〉Vk|φAB〉,
=
∑
k
√
q′k |ξ′k〉Vk|φAB〉, (23)
4where
|ξ′k〉 ≡ |χ′k〉|ξk〉 (24)
are the new orthonormal ancilla states. Comparing
with Eq. (16), we obtain the desired result
|Ψ′AB(pi)〉 = |ΨAB(ωj(pi))〉, (25)
where ωj(pi) ≡ {q′k} is the new effective probability
distribution.
Using the above result, we can prove the following
corollary:
Corollary It is in general not meaningful to spec-
ify a probability distribution to an untrustful party
in any quantum protocol, because he/she can always
cheat.
Proof Suppose the protocol specifies that Bob
should take certain action Vk on each qubit (or group
of qubits) in his possession according to a probability
distribution ωj = {q′k}. According to the theorem
just proven, he can always generate a superposition
of distributions with appropriately chosen pi’s, such
that the effective distribution is ωj [see Eqs. (17,
25)]. Obviously Bob would have no problem passing
any checks concerning ωj. In general some qubits are
measured and discarded in the checking procedure.
For each of the remaining qubits, Bob could either
stay with ωj , or he could measure the ancilla states
{|χi〉} in Eq. (17) to obtain a new distribution ωi
which is not necessarily equal to ωj. For a large
number of qubits, the probability that ωj is obtained
for every qubit is exponentially small. Hence it is
not meaningful to specify a probability distribution
to an untrustful Bob, because one can never be sure
that he is honest.
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